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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INES C. FOWLER,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

vs.

)

HAROLD W* TAYLOR, dba
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES,

)

CASE NO. 14399

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for commissions earned as a real
estate broker and real estate salesperson, and damages
for breach of an employment agreement.

There was a counter-

claim for breach of contract and libel.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment for respondent, Ines
C. Fowler, in the amount $9,715.25 as a real estate broker's
commission and $1,373.75 as a sales commission; dismissed
her claim for damages for breach of an employment agreement;
and dismissed Harold W. Taylor's counterclaim.

Mr. Taylor's

appeal challenges only that part of the judgment that awards
Mrs. Fowler $9,715.25 for her services as a real estate
broker.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September, 1971, Mrs. Fowler became a real estate
salesman under the real estate broker's license of Monroe
Tucker who was employed by Treasure Mountain Corporation, a
subsidiary of Greater Park City Company engaged in the sale
of condominiums and other real property in Park City, Utah.
(T.29).

Mr. Tucker received a 3 1/2 percent broker's sales

commission for the sale of Treasure Mountain properties of
which he paid a 2 1/2 percent sales commission to the salesmen under his broker's license.

(T.35).

The services of

Mr. Tucker were terminated and the Treasure Mountain salesmen worked under the broker's license of Warren King, an
officer and director of Greater Park City Company, and
president and director of Treasure Mountain Corporation.
(T.29).
On December 29, 1972, Treasure Mountain Corporation
filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission because the condominiums were to be sold
with rental pool management agreements and the company felt
they might be deemed securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act. (T.147).

A prospectus was also published

- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for the Crescent Ridge and Payday condominiums. (T.48).
Because securities were involved, Treasure Mountain
Corporation deemed it necessary to hire an independent real
estate and securities broker to handle the sale previously
handled by the company itself. (T.46).

On December 29,

1972, Mr* Taylor entered into an agreement with Treasure
Mountain Corporation whereby he would act as selling agent
and would receive 3 1/2 percent commission for the sale of
the condominium units. (Ex. P-12; T.109).
Mr. Taylor did not have a real estate broker's license,
and on or about December 20, 1972, he suggested to Mrs.
Fowler that it would be a good idea for her to activate her
license as a real estate broker. (T.30).

At that time he

presented to her some applications to the real estate
division by the terms of which she would activate her license
as a real estate broker, and Mr. Taylor, William H. Coleman,
Trina Leonard, and David D. Scherer, would be licensed as
salesmen under her brokerage. (T.30, 36; R.135).

Appellant's

purpose in requesting respondent to activate her real estate
broker's license was to permit him in his sales organization
to engage in the sales of the Crescent Ridge and Payday
condominiums in accordance with his contract with Treasure
Mountain Corporation, Mr. Taylor not then being licensed as

- 3 -
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a real estate broker and not qualified for such a license.
(T.30j R.135).

There was no discussion of Mrs. Fowler's

compensation for acting as real estate broker but both Mr.
Taylor and Mrs. Fowler were aware of the custom among real
estate brokers and salesmen for the real estate broker to
receive a portion of the sales commission paid by a seller
involving the sale of real property, and Mrs. Fowler expected
that a broker's commission would be paid to her for her
services. (T.34, 35, 153; R.136).

It is customary for

brokers to receive compensation for their- services. (T.81).
Between January 1, 1913,

and February 19, 1973, sales-

men working under Mrs. Fowler's real estate broker's license
and Mr. Taylor's securities broker's license realized gross
sales of $2,193,050.00, on which Treasure Mountain paid
Mr. Taylor a 3 1/2 percent commission. (Ex. P-24; Ex. P-12) .
Of this commission 2 1/2 percent was paid to the salesman
who negotiated the particular sales, and one percent, or
$21,930.50, was retained by Mr. Taylor. (R.136).

Although

Mrs. Fowler operated as a real estate broker, prepared
forms, and arranged with Mr. Taylor for an opening of a
trust account as required by Utah law, she received no
compensation for her services or the use of her real estate
broker's license. (T.35; R.131).

According to Mr. Taylor's

_ 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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own figures, a maximum of $l,500o00 per month or $2,500.00
during the period January 1, 1973, through February 19,
1973, would be chargeable against the brokerage commissions
for overhead. (R.136)«

Reducing the brokerage commission by

the $2,500.00 expended in connection with Mr, Taylor's
operations as a selling agent leaves a net broker's commission after expenses of $19,430.50. (R.136).
On February 19, 1973, Mr. Taylor succeeded in obtaining
a real estate broker*s license, whereupon he arranged for the
termination of the active broker's license of Mrs. Fowler and
transfer of the salesmen to conduct future transactions under
his own real estate broker's license. (T.35).
The trial court found that Mr. Taylor orally engaged
Mrs. Fowler to serve as real estate broker and salesman for
the sale of condominiums owned by Treasure Mountain Corporation
for a period from January 1, 1973, through February 19,
1973 (R.135); that the Statute of Frauds has no application
to the transaction between the parties since it did not
involve the legal relationship between an owner and real
estate salesman (R.139); that a broker's license was required
by law for Mr. Taylor to discharge his contractual obligations to Treasure Mountain Corporation (R.131); that it is .
customary in the real estate business that a percentage of

- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the sale of salesmen be paid to or retained by the broker
under whose license the salesman operates (R.136); that Mrs.
Fowler is entitled to $9,715.25, which is one-half of the
net broker's commission of $19,430.50. (R.136, 139, 140).
ARGUMENT
I

.;•

V:'.':

;.•,"'"•"'

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MRS. FOWLER'S
CLAIM FOR A REAL ESTATE BROKER1 S COMMISSION FROM MR. TAYLOR
IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Utah Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 Utah Code Annotated
1953, provides:
Certain agreements void unless written
and subscribed. In the following cases every
agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:
* * *

(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell
real estate for compensation.
The purpose of this and similar statutes is to discourage
unfounded claims for commissions between the broker or agent
and the owner of land.

The Statute of Frauds has no applica-

tion to agreements between brokers or a broker and a salesman, neither of whom is the owner of the land.

The trial

court correctly understood this distinction as evidenced by
the following pertinent observations from its decision:

- 6 -
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The Court concludes that the Statute of Frauds
has no application to the transaction between
the parties since it does not involve the legal
relationship between an owner and real estate
salesman* (R.130K
The trial court*s decision is buttressed by the Utah
case of Anderson v. Johnson,, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725
(1945), wherein this court held that an agreement to assist
a real estate broker in procuring listings of property for
sale in consideration of a share of the commission was not
within the Statute of Frauds.

This court stated:

The contention of respondent that plaintiff
cannot recover because his agreement was oral
is untenable. The contract was one of employment and not involving any right or interest
in land. See Johnson v. Allen, Utah 1945, 158
P. 2d 134 * The proposition that a contract for
fee or commission may be recovered by agent
from broker though not in writing is upheld in
[citing cases from Californiaf Wyoming, Nebraska,
and Louisiana].
There have been a great number of cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes, and they are quite
harmonious in holding that such statutes are enacted to protect the owners of real property against claims by real estate
brokers or salesmen.

They do not require a written agreement

between brokers, or between a broker and a salesman with respect
to the sharing of real estate commissions payable by an owner
or seller of real estate.

The law is summarized in an annota-

tion, "Agreement between brokers as within statute requiring

- 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreements for commission for the sale of real estate to be
in writing", 44 A.L.R. 2d 741, 745:
While the statutes in particular jurisdictions
differ in important respects, the more numerous
referring either to "employment" of a broker,
payment of a "commission" or requiring that the
writing be signed by the "owner," there appears
to be general agreement that such statutes, unless they specifically refer to an agreement between brokers, were designed specifically to protect owners of real estate against unfounded claims
of brokers, and therefore are not applicable to
agreements between brokers to pool their efforts
and share in the commission thereby earned.
Appellant relies on the cases of Baugh v. Parley, 112
Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1947), Case v. Ralph', 56 Utah 243, 188
P. 640 (1920), Watson v. Ode11, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772 (1921)
and Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 P. 915
(1930) to support his argument that Mrs. Fowler's claim for
a commission based upon an implied agreement is void under
the Statute of Frauds. These cases are easily distinguished
because they all involve dealings between owners of land and
real estate brokers or salesmen.
It is true, of course, that where an agreement is unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds, the courts
will not permit recovery on an implied contract or a quasi
contract, because such recovery would thwart the prohibitions
of the statute.

However, where an implied or quasi contract

does not run counter to the Statute of Frauds, there is no
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reason for application of such a rule.

In 37 C.J.S. Statute

of Frauds § 229, this principle is stated in the following
manner:
The statute of frauds applies to contracts
implied in fact, and hence if they fall
within its scope they are unenforceable.
This rule does not apply to an implied or
inferred contract which does not fall within the scope of the statute . . . (Emphasis
added)
Since the agreement wherein Mr. Taylor engaged Mrs,
Fowler to serve as real estate broker and salesman is not
within the Statute of Frauds, there is no rule which would
prevent the court from raising an implied contract or permitting recovery on the principle of restitution.
Appellant's final argument, that even if 25-5-4(5) Utah
Code Annotated 1953 pertains only to agreements between real
estate brokers or agents and owners of real property, it
would apply in the instant situation because Mr. Taylor was
the agent or alter ego of the property owner, merits little
consideration.

The point is raised for the first time on

this appeal; it contradicts the terms of the Treasure Mountain prospectus (Ex. D-2, pp.1, 4) and the agreement between
Taylor and Treasure Mountain (Ex. 12, p.6); and it has no
support in the evidence.

Even if Mrs. Fowler could not have

enforced the agreement as against Treasure Mountain, it makes
no difference because Treasure Mountain did pay the commissions
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II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT, IMPLIED IN FACT, THAT MR. TAYLOR WOULD PAY TO
MRS. FOWLER THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HER SERVICES AS A REAL
ESTATE BROKER.
Activities of real estate brokers and real estate salesmen, and their right to participate in commissions for the
sale of real estate, are regulated by law.
The following statutory provisions from Title 61,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are pertinent:
61-2-1. License Required. - It shall
be unlawful for any person, co-partnership or
corporation to engage in the business, act in
the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as
a real estate broker or a real estate salesman
within this chapter without first obtaining a
license under the provisions of this chapter.
61-2-10. Salesmen's Right To Commission Restricted. - It shall be unlawful
for any real estate salesman to accept a
commission or valuable consideration for the
performance of any of the acts herein specified from any person, except his employer,
who must be a licensed real estate broker.
61-2-18. Unlicensed Broker - Action For
Recovery of Compensation Prohibited - Action
By Real Estate Salesmen. - (a) No person,
partnership, association or corporation shall
bring or maintain an action in any court of
this state for the recovery of a commission,
a fee, or compensation for any act done or
service rendered the doing or rendering of
which is prohibited under the provisions of
this act to other than licensed real estate
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time
of doing such act or the rendering of such
service.
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(b) No real estate salesman shall have
the right to institute suit in his own name
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation for services as a real estate
salesman except where the action is against
the broker but any such action shall be instituted and brought by the broker with whom
the salesman is connected.
In order for Mr. Taylor to carry out the obligations of
his contract with Treasure Mountain Corporation, it was
necessary that the salesmen within the organization operate
under the license of a real estate broker, pursuant to the
provisions of 61-2-1.

When Mr. Taylor requested Mrs. Fowler

to renew her license, the circumstances were such that a
person in his position would ordinarily be expected to
compensate her for her services, and a person in Mrs. Fowler's
position would ordinarily expect compensation.

Mrs. Fowler

testified that she expected to receive a brokerfs commission
of one percent, the same rate paid to previous brokers:
Q
(By Mr. Roe) Mrs. Fowler, was there any
discussion with respect to brokerage commissions:
A
He only said that it was good for me to
activate my license.
Q
A
subject.

So the subject wasn't mentioned at all?
No, not at all. He didn't approach the

Q
At that time what expectations did you
have, if any, respecting commissions?

- 11 -
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A
Well, all the sales for Treasure Mountain
Corporation had been done on the premises that the
Broker will get one percent commission on all sales.
Q

And that was your expectation?

A
And that was my expectation. He was the
Salesman and I was the Broker, and I expected to be
paid as a Broker. (T.34, 35).
It is customary among real estate brokers and salesmen for the broker to receive a portion of the selling
commission.

This is established not only by the custom and

practice with relation to the sale of the Treasure Mountain
condominiums, where both before and after /the Taylor-Treasure
Mountain contract the broker received a one percent commission
and the salesman received a 2 1/2 percent commission on the
sales of condominiums, but it is true among real estate
agents and brokers generally.

Robert Monson, who testified,

in behalf of Mr. Taylor, stated that it was customary for
real estate brokers to receive a percentage of the commission.
In E. Friedman, Real Estate Encyclopedia (Prentice
Hall, 1960), it is stated:
SHARING OF BROKER'S COMMISSION: A salesman is
paid for his services by his employer. His
compensation generally consists of a percentage
of the broker's commission earned on sales made
by the salesman. The salesman is not entitled
to collect commissions direct from principals.
Each real estate organization establishes its
own schedule for division of commissions between the employer and its salesmen. Some

- 12 -
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real estate organizations pay their salesmen
50% of commissions earned, others pay 40% with
10% to the supervisor. In some firms, step-ups
are provided? if the brokerage commission exceeds a certain amount, an additional 5% may
be paid; above that amount, a further percentage may be allowed.
And see A. Ring, Real Estate Principles and Practices
Chapter 18 (Prentice Hall, 1972):
The compensation of a salesman depends entirely
on his arrangement with his employer, the broker.
A novice may receive a small salary and a small
share of any commissions earned by the broker as
a result of the salesman's work. As he gains in
experience and usefulness, his compensation changes*
Ultimately he reaches a point at which his compensation is from 40 to 60% of the brokerage paid on
his transactions, quite possibly with a drawing account against such earnings.
The circumstances under which the brokerage services
were performed by Mrs. Fowler are such that the court should
find a contract implied-in-fact under which Mr. Taylor
agreed to pay her the reasonable value of those services.
With respect to implied-in-fact contracts, the following
statement is found in 17 Am.Jur. 2d Contracts § 4:
There is a wide variety of particular circumstances under which contracts will be
implied~in-fact. Thus, where a person performs services, furnishes property, or expends money for another at the other's request and there is no express agreement as
to compensation, the promise to pay the
reasonable value of the services or property
or to reimburse for money expended may properly be implied where, but only where, the
circumstances warrant such an inference.

- 13 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Generally, there is an implication of a promise to pay for valuable services rendered
with the knowledge and approval of the recepient, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary. A promise to pay the reasonable
value of the service is implied where one
performs for another, with the other's knowledge, a useful service of a character that
is usually charged for, and the latter expresses no dissent or avails himself of the
service. * * *
That contracts may be implied in fact, without express
agreement, was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in
Kimball Elevator Company v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah
2d 289, 272 P.2d 583 (1954).

Although the court failed to

find an implied contract in that case, it stated the general
rule as follows:
It is of course conceded that a contract may
be made out even though there be no express
words formally stating it, and that the
promise may be inferred wholly or in part
from such conduct as justifies the promisee
in understanding that the promisor intended
to make it.
And see Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465
(1957), wherein the Utah Supreme Court, in upholding a finding of an implied contract, said:
It is sufficient for our purposes to affirm
the court's ruling because it is well established that the meeting of minds necessary
for the formation of a contract can be found
from conduct and circumstances as well as by
verbal expression.

- 14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is generally held that where one engages or accepts
beneficial services of another for which compensation is
customarily made and naturally anticipated# even though
there is no expressed agreement for compensation, the law
implies an understanding or intent to pay the value of the
services rendered.

In Florey v. Sinkey, 77 Nev. 275, 362

P. 2d 271 (1961), the plaintiff real estate broker brought an
action for the reasonable value of his services in procuring
a purchaser for defendant's mining property.

No agreement

to pay compensation was entered into by the parties, but
evidence was presented that it was a custom in the area for
the seller of mining property to pay 10 percent of the
consideration actually received by him to the person who was
the procuring cause of the sale.

The trial court determined

that the custom was sufficiently known to charge the defendant
with constructive knowledge of the same and held that there
was an implied agreement to pay plaintiff the reasonable
value of his services.

On appeal the Nevada Supreme Court

stated:
The trial court found that there was an
implied agreement on the part of Florey
to pay Sinkey the reasonable value of his
services, and as there was substantial
evidence in support of such finding, as
well as the other findings of the trial
court, the same may not be disturbed on
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this appeal. The amount found to be the
reasonable value of Sinkey's services was
the same as 10% of the $84,000 found to
have been actually received by Florey from
Kaufmann. In effect, the sum found to be
due Sinkey as compensation for his services,
under the established custom of the mining
locality, became the reasonable value of
such services. (Citations omitted.) 362
P.2d at 273.
Appellant concedes that where no compensation is agreed
upon in advance for services requested by and performed by
another, there is a presumption that compensation was intended.
However, the contention is made that the presumption is rebutted by the circumstances of this particular case.
Appellant's primary argument is that Mrs. Fowler's
strong self-interest in complying with Mr. Taylor's request
to activate her real estate broker's license negates any
inference of an implied-in-fact agreement for compensation.
However, appellant fails to take into consideration that
Mrs. Fowler's self-interest is no different than the interest
of any other broker in having salesmen working under him and
sharing in the commissions from their sales. Mrs. Fowler
would not have taken on the added responsibility and potential
liability of acting as real estate broker without expecting
additional compensation.

Appellant was not justified in

assuming that Mrs. Fowler would comply with his request to
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act as real estate broker and then receive only the standard
2 1/2 percent sales commission on her sales.
Appellants second and third arguments in support of
his contention that there was no implied-in-fact agreement
is that there was no agreement between the parties respecting
compensation and that the intentions of the parties as to
compensation were clearly contrary to each other.

There is

no basis for these arguments, as the law requires neither an
agreement nor similar intentions of the parties for the
court to find an implied agreement for compensation.

To

find an implied-in-fact contract, there must be mutual
assent of the parties to contract but there is no requirement
of mutual assent as to compensation.

Florey v. Sinkey,

supra.
In the case at bar, the mutual assent required was
simply that both Mr. Taylor and Mrs. Fowler agree that Mrs.
Fowler would act as real estate broker.

After this fact

was established, the court properly found an implied-in-fact
agreement to pay Mrs. Fowler reasonable compensation for her
services.

The law in this regard is summarized in the

following manner:
If there is no agreement fixing the compensation which a broker is to receive for his
services, but there is a well-established custom
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in the neighborhood with respect to the amount
of compensation to which a broker is entitled,
the law implies a promise on the part of the
person employing him to pay the usual and customary commissions* If no such custom or usage can be shown, the broker is entitled to
reasonable compensation. 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers
§ 161.
In the absence of a special agreement as to
the matter, the broker is entitled to a fair
and reasonable compensation for his services.
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 78.
In this case the evidence shows there was a well established custom within the sales organization of Treasure
Mountain Corporation to pay the broker a one percent commission on the sales price of all units sold.

The court

properly found an implied agreement to compensate Mrs.
Fowler in a similar manner.
Appellant's final argument in support of his contention
that the court erred in finding an implied agreement is that
there can be no implied-in-fact contract where the law with
respect to such contract has not been complied with. Appellant cites Rule 19 of the Utah State Securities Commission,
Real Estate Division, as requiring brokers to provide salesmen with the terms of employment in writing to avoid misunderstandings, and Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651
(Utah 1974) for the proposition that no contractual liability
can be created without compliance with the applicable ordinances.

The case involved an ordinance that voided contracts
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not signed by the City Recorder.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable in that
no voiding ordinance is involved.

Instead, Rule 19 of the

rules and regulations issued by the Department of Business
Regulation, Real Estate Division, requires that brokers
provide salesmen with the terms of their employment in
writing, but provides no sanction for failure to do so.

In

addition^ this rule was enacted for the protection of real
estate salesmen, who stand to benefit only if they can
recover on oral or implied contracts when the broker has
failed to designate in writing the terms of their employment.
To construe the rule as contended by appellant would be a
clear misapplication of the law.
The evidence in this case shows that there is a custom and practice among real estate brokers and salesmen
that the broker will share in the commission; there was a
particular custom with respect to the sales made for
Treasure Mountain Corporation; Mrs. Fowler activated her
real estate broker's license with the expectation that she
would receive a brokerage commission; and Mrs. Fowler's
brokerage services were beneficial to Mr. Taylor.

The cir-

cumstances, therefore, contain all the elements of a contract
implied-in-fact and support the lower court's decision•
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Ill
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THERE WAS AN
AGREEMENT, IMPLIED IN LAW, THAT MR. TAYLOR WOULD PAY TO
MRS. FOWLER THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HER SERVICES AS A
REAL ESTATE BROKER.
Mrs. Fowler is entitled to recover for the value of her
brokerage services on principles of restitution, or qtiasi
contract.

Valuable services were performed on behalf of

Mr. Taylor at his request, and he received a benefit by
virtue of the performance of those services, i.e., he was
able to perform his contract with Treasure Mountain Corporation for the sale of condominiums. Without Mrs. Fowler's
active broker's license, the sales program could not have
proceeded.
The most general statement of rule regarding restitution is found in Restatement of Restitution § 1:
A person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.
With respect to benefits conferred at request, the
following is found in Restatement of Restitution § 107:
(1) A person of full capacity who, pursuant to a contract with another, has performed
services or transferred property to the other
or otherwise has conferred a benefit upon him
is not entitled to compensation therefor other
than in accordance with the terms of such bargain, unless the transaction is rescinded for
fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence or illegality, or unless the other has failed to
perform his part of the bargain.
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(2) In the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests another to perform services
for him or to transfer property to him thereby
bargains to pay therefor, (Emphasis added)
Another statement of the rule is found in 66 Am.Jur.
2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 21:
The performance of services at the request
of another confers a benefit upon such other
within the principle that a person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
required to make restitution to the other. In
the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests
or orders another to perform services for him
thereby bargains to pay for the services rendered.
Where services are rendered or materials are
furnished upon request, it is ordinarily a reasonable inference that the parties understand and
agree that they are to be paid for, and accordingly, one rendering services or furnishing
materials at another's request ordinarily may
recover from the other in quantum meruit for
the value thereof. The law will imply an agreement to pay the reasonable worth of services
performed for another at the latter1s special
instance and request where there is no agreement with reference to compensation to be paid.
In McCollum v. Clother, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468
(1952), the trial court granted judgment for plaintiff in
quantum meruit for services rendered and travel expenses
incurred in securing buyers and bidders on certain machinery
and equipment which was sold for defendant's benefit at a
sheriff's sale after foreclosure of a mortgage.

There was

no agreement for compensation, but the Supreme Court held
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that the trial court had properly found an implied contract
to pay for the services. The court said:
The question of moment, thenf is as to
the authorization of this work. The rule
applicable to the situation is contained in
the Restatement of Agency, Volume 2, Section
441: "Except where the relationship of the
parties, the triviality of the services, or
other circumstances indicate that the parties
have agreed otherwise, it is inferred that one
who requests or permits another to perform
services for him as his agent promises to pay
for them." (Citing cases and authorities.)
It is appreciated that this rule should
not be applied to bind one under implied contract who merely permits services to.be rendered him, or accepts benefits from another,
under such circumstances that he may reasonably assume they are given gratuitiously. The
law should not require everyone to keep on guard
against such possibilities by warning persons
offering services that no pay is to be expected.
It is, therefore, essential that the court should
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of
an implied contract, as contrasted to express
contract where the parties have actually defined
and agreed to the terms they are to be bound
by. With such caution in mind, the test for the
court to apply was: under all the evidence,
were the circumstances such that the plaintiff
could reasonably assume he was to be paid and
that the defendant should have reasonably expected to pay for such services.
Appellant cites the cases of Baugh v. Parley, supra,
and Rapp v. Salt Lake City, supra, to support his argument
that Mrs. Fowler cannot obtain quasi-contractual relief.
These cases are readily distinguishable.

In the former
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case, the court refused to award plaintiff the value of his
services on the basis that the defendant did not receive any
real benefit from plaintiff's actions and that the purpose
of the Statute of Frauds would be nullified by granting quantum meruit relief.

In the latter case a quasi-contractual

remedy was not allowed, on the statutory grounds previously
referred to (all contractual obligations with the city are
void without satisfying the requisite formalities), and
also because the action was basically a tort claim for
deceit; to obtain quasi-contract relief, the obligation must
more closely resemble a contract action than a tort claim.
Mrs. Fowler performed valuable services for Mr. Taylor
under circumstances in which he would be expected to pay for
them.

They were conferred at his request; they were bene-

ficial to him; and they fulfilled an obligation that he had
to Treasure Mountain Corporation, i.e., to obtain the necessary licenses to carry out the corporation's sales program.
Mrs. Fowler is entitled to restitution for the reasonable
value of the benefit conferred.
IV

.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY COMPUTED THE VALUE OF
MRS. FOWLER'S BROKERAGE SERVICES AT $9,715.25.
The trial court's computation of damages is set forth
in page 2 of its decision:
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The Court finds that the sales made by
salesmen during the period in question totaled $2,193,053.00, that the brokers commissions
based on one percent of this price equals
$21,930.50, that the expenses required to be
paid in the operation of the broker's office
and expended by the defendant was the sum of
$2,500.00 reducing the net commissions to
$19,430.50. Of this amount the plaintifff
would be entitled to one-half or the sum of
$9,715.25 since the Treasure Mountain agreement with defendant included his services as
Securities Broker as well as that of Real Estate Broker, which plaintiff served as during
said period. (R.131).
Appellant concedes that if Mrs. Fowler is entitled to
recovery of damages, the measure of recovery would be the
reasonable value of her services. However, appellant contends that the "50-50 split" used by the court in arriving at
the amount of judgment does not reflect the reasonable value
of Mrs. Fowler*s services.
Contrary to appellant's contention, in the absence of
an express agreement, a "50-50 split" is the reasonable
method to divide commissions between brokers.

In 12 Am.Jur.

2d Brokers § 177, the general law is expressed as follows:
The amount recoverable under an agreement between brokers to divide or share commissions would appear to depend largely upon
the terms of the particular agreement, the
extent of the services performed, and the
circumstances of the particular case. It
would seem that in the absence of a contrary
stipulation, an agreement for a division of
compensation would contemplate an equal
division. . . . (Emphasis added.)
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The court's assumption that one-half of the net commission was to be paid to Mrs. Fowler for her services as
real estate broker and one-half of the net commission was
to be paid to Mr. Taylor for his services as securities
broker gave to each party compensation for the reasonable
value of their services and was the most equitable decision.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Fowler performed valuable services as real estate
broker for Treasure Mountain Corporation at the request and
for the benefit of the appellant, Mr. Taylor.

Although there

was no agreement fixing the amount of compensation Mrs.
Fowler was to receive for her brokerage services, the trial
court correctly determined that she was entitled to reasonable compensation.

The court's decision is supported either

under a theory of unjust enrichment or by implying a promise
on the part of Mr. Taylor to pay Mrs. Fowler the reasonable
value of her services.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
Terry L. Christiansen
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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